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Deakin University, Australia 
This article focuses generally on the interaction among several internal 
company law doctrines such as the supremacy of the articles of 
association; that other organs cannot interfere with powers exclusively 
conferred upon a particular organ; that courts will not readily interfere 
with internal company matters; that directors are under a duty to act in 
good faith and in the best interest of the company as a whole and under a 
duty to use their powers for proper or permissible purposes; and that 
there are some remedies available to shareholders if directors did not 
perform their powers for a proper or permissible purpose. The specific 
aim with the article is to establish when and why the courts will be 
prepared to set aside decisions by directors if they have taken them for an 
improper or impermissible purpose. The article concludes that the courts 
will be prepared to set the decisions of directors aside when they have 
used a particular power substantially or primarily for an improper or 
impermissible purpose. When the exercise of directors' powers is 
challenged under circumstances where there were both permissible and 
impermissible purposes for exercising a particular power, there is no 
alternative for the court but to inquire into the complex area of the state 
of mind of those who acted and the motive on which they acted. This is, 
in fact, second-guessing the decisions of directors. 
1 Introduction 
There are quite a few prominent academic writings dealing with general 
internal company law principles in South African academic literature. 
These articles cover aspects such as the division of powers between 
company organs, and the role, functions and duties of company directors. 
However, it is remarkable that not a single article in South African legal 
periodicals deal pertinently with directors' duty to use powers for their 
proper or permissible purpose. This is a prominent principle and forms 
the primary focus of this article. 
* BProc, LLB, LLM, LLD (UOFS). Professor of Law, School of Law, Deakin University, 
Australia. 
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2 Some Phraseology and the Scope of Investigation 
All current publications on South African company law and company 
directors discuss directors' duty to use powers for their proper or 
permissible purpose. Most of them specifically classify this as a fiduciary 
duty, but they describe this duty in a slightly different way. Beuthin does 
not deal with this duty under a separate heading, but refers to directors' 
duty to 'exercise their powers for a proper purpose for which they were 
conferred'; 1 Blackman refers to the '[d]uty to exercise powers for proper 
purpose'; 2 Cilliers and Benade use '[f]ailure to exercise ... powers for the 
purpose for which they were conferred'; 3 Hahlo talks about directors' 
'[d]uty to act within their powers'; 4 Henochsberg still has no separate 
part allocated to this duty, but discusses it under two separate headings, 
namely the '[d]uty to act only under available powers' and the '[d]uty to 
act bona fide in the interest of the company'; 5 Naude refers to the fact 
that '[e]lke bevoegdheid moet vir die doel uitgeoefen word waarvoor dit 
aan die direksie of bepaalde direkteur verleen is'; 6 while Van Dorsten 
describes this duty under the heading '[p]owers must be exercised for the 
purpose for which they were conferred'. 7 
The same trend of subtle different ways of describing this duty may be 
detected from the decided cases. It has been held that 'a person having a 
power, must execute it bona fide for the end designed, otherwise it is 
corrupt and void'; 8 or that directors may only used their powers within 'a 
literal execution of the power, with a purpose which it does ... sanction'; 9 
or that 'powers conferred upon [directors] cannot be exercised ... for any 
purpose foreign to the power'; 10 or that directors must prevent 'an abuse 
... of the powers conferred on them by the articles'; 11 or that a director's 
'powers must be used bona fide for the purpose for which it was 
conferred'; 12 or that directors must exercise their powers 'bona fide and 
not for irrelevant purposes'; 13 or that directors' powers must be 
1 RC Beuthin & S M Luiz Beuthin's Basic Company Law 2 ed (1992) at 224. 
2 MS Blackman 'Companies' in: W A Joubert (founding ed) The Law of South Africa 
('LA WSA') vol 4, part 2 (1996) in par 121 at 185. 
3 HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Henning, JJ du Plessis, PA Delport, L de Koker and IT Pretoruis 
Cilliers & Benade: Corporate Law 3 ed (2000) ('Cilliers & Benade') in par 10.27-10.29 at 146. 
4 JT Pretorius, PA Delport, Michelle Havenga & Maria Vermaas Hah/o's South African 
Company Law through the Cases- A Source Book 6 ed (1999) ('Hahlo') at 294. 
5 B Galgut (consulting ed), JA Kunst, P Delport & Q Vorster (eds) Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act, vol 2, loose leaf, Service Issue 18, 5 ed (2003) at 466. 
6 S J Naude Die Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur met Besondere Verwysing na die 
Interne Maatskappyverband (1970) at 111. 
7 J L van Dorsten Rights, Powers and Duties of Directors (1992) at 188. 
8 Aleyn v Belchier (1758) 1 Edn 132, 28 ER 634 at 138, 637 as quoted in Ngurli Ltd v McCann 
(1953) 90 CLR 425 (HC of A) at 440. 
9 Vatcher v Paull [1915] AC 372 (CA) at 378; Ngurli Ltd v McCann supra note 8 at 438. 
10 Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150 (HC of A) at 185, per Dixon J. 
11 Ngurli Ltd v McCann supra note 8 at 439. 
12 Idem at 439-40, articulating what was decided in Mills v Mills supra note 10. 
13 Harlow's Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co NL (1968) 121 CLR 483 
(HC of A) at 493. 
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'exercised for the purpose for which it was granted (or conferred)'; 14 or 
that directors may not exercise their powers for 'an improper purpose or 
alternatively [abuse] their directors' powers'; 15 or that directors may not 
exercise their powers for 'an impermissible and vitiating purpose'; 16 or 
that directors may not exercise their powers 'for a purpose foreign to the 
object and purpose of the power'. 17 
It is clear from this short analysis of some South African sources and 
the decided cases that one and the same duty could be described under 
different banners. The way in which the duty is tagged also depends on 
whether it is stated positively or whether the focus is rather on the breach 
of the duty. At least the following possibilities exist if the focus is on the 
breach of the duty: directors may not misuse or abuse their powers; or 
directors may not use their powers for an improper or an impermissible 
purpose. It is interesting to note that not all these negative statements 
lend them to be converted into positive statements. For instance, it is 
more difficult to convert the statement that directors 'may not misuse or 
abuse their powers' into a positive statement without using different 
words. On the other hand, the second statement could easily be converted 
into a positive description of the duty, namely that 'directors may only 
use their powers for a proper or a permissible purpose'. 
Whether there is any real significance in the way in which the courts 
have described this duty or its breach will require a careful analysis of 
exactly how the courts employed the terminology and a comparison of 
that with the facts of each case. That falls outside the scope of this article. 
In this article the terms 'proper (improper) purpose' and 'permissible 
(impermissible) purpose' 18 will be used as synonyms and as indications of 
whether or not the powers directors exercised were misused or abused. 
This article only deals with powers conferred upon directors, normally 
by the articles of association, to fulfil internal actions, for instance the 
power to manage the business of the company; the power to issue shares; 
the power to recommend dividends; and the power not to register 
somebody as a shareholder. It does not deal with the question whether 
the directors exceed the powers of the company as described in the 
14 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (CA) at 834B-C and 834H. 
15 Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tiles Co Ltd (1989) 15 ACLR 230 (CA, NSW) at 247. 
16 Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 5 ACLR 715 (HC of A) at 720. 
17 Permanent Building Society v McGee (1993) 11 ACLC 761 (SC, SA) at 762. LS Sealy "'Bona 
Fides" and "Proper Purposes" in Corporate Decisions' (1989) 15 Monash University LR 265 at 
268 explains the use of various interchangeable terms as follows: '[I]n company law, the court may 
say that the relevant power has been abused, or exceeded, or not genuinely exercised, or that those 
who exercised it acted upon irrelevant considerations, or from an improper motive.' In a 
stimulating article, Franz J Ranero 'Managed Investment Schemes: The Responsible Entity's 
Duty to Act for Proper Purposes' (1999) 17 Company & Securities U 422, discusses the 'duty to 
act for a proper purpose' under the catchy phrase '[f]raud on the power' (see at 423-7), but later he 
distinguishes the two concepts (see at 427ft). 
18 As far as I could determine, the phrase 'permissible or impermissible purpose', rather than 
the more traditional phrase 'proper or improper purpose', was first used in Whitehouse v Carlton 
Hotel supra note 16 at 718ff. In this case there was a seamless transition from the more traditional 
phraseology ('proper or improper purpose') to the 'permissible or impermissible' phraseology 
even though the Court relied on cases where the traditional phrases were employed. 
DIRECTORS' DUTY TO USE THEIR POWERS 311 
memorandum of association, the area where the ultra vires doctrine 
becomes prominent. It also does not deal with the interaction among the 
ultra vires doctrine, the Turquand rule, and s 36 of the Companies Act 61 
of 1973. Those areas have been covered quite extensively by others. 19 
This article only deals with how the courts determine the purpose or 
purposes for which powers are conferred upon directors by the articles 
and whether the directors have exercised these powers for a proper or 
permissible purpose. In this sense the article deals with what could 
commonly be described as the intra vires exercise of powers conferred 
upon directors by the articles. 20 
3 The Doctrine of the Supremacy of the Articles of Association 
Provisions in a company's articles may have considerable consequences 
because of the doctrine, now recognised in the South African law, of the 
supremacy of the articles of association. In LSA (UK) Ltd v Impala 
Platinum Holdings (Ltd), 21 Schutz JA explained the principle of 
supremacy of the articles of association as follows: 
'What it amounts to is that the founding members, and also a later body of members by 
special resolution, may order the internal affairs of their company in the way that suits 
them best, subject to such prohibitions as may exist in the Act or any other law, statutory 
or common. This di¥'ensation is unsurprising when one statute governs many diverse 
forms of company.' 2 
A very specific consequence of this doctrine is that powers conferred 
upon a certain organ by the articles, are within the exclusive power of 
that organ and that such powers cannot be usurped by any of the 
company's other organs, 23 unless exceptional circumstances apply. 
Under such exceptional circumstances, certain powers of the board 
may revert to the general meeting, 24 but the specific organ that will have 
19 See generally Cilliers & Benade op cit note 3 in pars 12.05-12.39 at 180-96. See in particular 
Naude op cit note 6 at 114-5; SJ Naude "n Nuwe Benadering tot die Funksie van 
Maatskappydoelstellings' (1971) 88 SALJ 505; SJ Naude 'Company Contracts: The Effect of 
Section 36 of the New Act' (1974) 91 SAU 315; JS McClennan 'The Ultra Vires Doctrine and the 
Turquand Rule in Company Law- A Suggested Solution' (1979) 96 SALJ 329; MJ Oosthuizen 
'Aanpassing van die Verteenwoordigingsreg in die Maatskappyverband' (1979) Tydskrif vir die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 1; JSA Fourie 'Die Wisselwerking tussen Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappye-
regleerstukke' (1988) 51 Tydskrifvir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 328; MS Blackman 
'Director's Duty to Exercise their Powers for an Authorised Business Purpose' (1990) 2 SA Mere 
U I; JSA Fourie 'Volmagbeperking en Ultra Vires-handelinge- Aspekte van Artikel 36 van die 
Maatskappywet in Oenskou' (1990) 1 Stellenbosch LR 388. 
20 See Colin Baxter 'Ultra Vires and Agency Untwined' (1970) 28 Cambrige U 280ff for a 
comprehensive analysis of the various ways in which powers can be exercised in company law 
context with particular reference to older cases decided in this area. 
21 Unreported, SCA, 28 Mar 2000, case no 222/1998: see ~www.uovs.ac.zaffacflawfappealf 
jud~menf; -2 See urther JJ du Plessis 'Beskikkingsvryheid oor Interne Bestuursorganisasie, Interne 
Bevoegdheidsverdeling en die Prominensie van die Statute in die Maatskappyereg' (1992) Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 94 at 99, referred to by Schutz JAin his judgment. 
23 See Cilliers & Benade op cit note 3 in par 7.08 at 87 and cases referred to there. See also The 
Duke Group Ltd (In Liq) v Pi/mer (1998) 16 ACLC 567 (SC, SA) at 691, and generally Sealy op cit 
note 17 at 272. 
24 Cilliers & Benade op cit note 3 in para 7.11 at 88. 
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the default power to exercise a power if a particular organ cannot or will 
not exercise its powers, will depend on the facts of the case. 25 The 
particular power at stake and the specific organ that cannot or will not 
exercise the power, are factors to be taken into consideration. 26 
4 The Doctrine of Non-interference with Internal Matters of a 
Company 
Closely linked with the doctrine of supremacy of the articles of 
association is the principle that courts are reluctant to interfere with the 
internal affairs of companies. 27 It has been held on several occasions that 
courts will not second-guess the decisions properly taken by directors as 
part of powers conferred upon them by the articles. 28 The court can, in 
actual fact, not interfere with internal decisions arrived at bona fide and 
honestly, as explained by Lord Wilberforce in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd: 29 
'Their Lordships accept that such a matter as the raising of finance is one of management, 
within the responsibility of the directors: they accept that it would be wrong for the court 
to substitute its opinion for that of management, or indeed to question the correctness of 
management's decision, on such a question, if bona fide arrived at. There is no appeal on 
merits from management decisions to courts of law: nor will courts of law assume to act 
as a kind of supervisory board over decisions within the powers of management honestly 
arrived at.' 
The reason why a court will not interfere with duly exercised internal 
decisions of directors was summarised neatly by Kirby P in Darvall v 
North Sydney Brick: 30 
25 This principle is explained neatly by Blackman op cit note 2 in par 42 at 73: 'Where the 
articles confer powers (expressly or impliedly) on the directors, the general rule is that the 
members in general meeting cannot, unless empowered to do so by the articles, also exercise those 
powers (that is to say they have no 'collateral powers'). 
26 See Jean Jacques du Plessis Maatskappyregtelike Grondslae van die Regsposisie van 
Direkteure en Besturende Direkteure (LLD thesis, University of the Orange Free State (1990)) 
at 38-42. 
27 Lord v The Governor and Company of Copper Miners (1848) 2 PH 739 , 41 ER 1129 at 1134; 
MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 ChD 13 (CA) at 23; Isle of Wight Railway Company v Tahourdin 
(1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA) at 333; Bainbridge v Smith (1889) 41 ChD 462 (CA) at 474. This principle 
is firmly imbedded in the South African law: see Adams v North 1933 CPD 100 at 108; Cooper v 
Garratt 1945 WLD 137 at 148 and 152; and cases cited in Makhuva v Lukoto Bus Service (Pty) 
Ltd 1987 (3) SA 376 (V) at 393I-395J. See generally RB (1974) 48 Australian LJ 319. 
28 See in particular Hoole v Great Western Railroad Co (1867) 3 ChApp 262 at 268 and 275; 
Bond v Barrow Haematite Steel Co [1902] 1 Ch 353 at 368; the cases cited in The Australian 
Metropolitan Life Assurance Co Ltd v Ure (1923) 33 CLR 199 (HC of A) at 217; Shuttleworth v 
Cox Brothers & Company (Maidenhead) Limited [1927] 2 KB 9 at 23-4; Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd 
[1942] Ch 304 (CA) at 306; Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254 at 268B-E; Wayde v NSW Rugby 
League Ltd (1985) 10 ACLR 87 (HC of A) at 93-4 and 95-6. See also Sealy op cit note 17 at 277; 
Robert Baxt 'Second Guessing Directors' Decisions on Takeovers- A Mixed Message from the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal' (1990) 8 Company & Securities LJ 26 at 27. 
29 Supra note 14 at 832E-F. See also Wayde v NSW Rugby League supra note 28 at 93-4; 
Harlow's Nominees v Woodside Oil supra note 13 at 493. 
30 Supra note 15 at 247. See also Harlow's Nominees v Woodside Oil supra note 13 at 493: 
'Directors in whom are vested the right and duty of deciding where the company's interests lie and 
how they are to be served may be concerned with a wide range of practical considerations, and 
their judgment, if exercised in good faith and not for irrelevant purposes, is not open to review in 
the courts'. 
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'Courts properly refrain from assuming the management of corporations and substituting 
their decisions and assessments for those of directors. They do so, inter alia, because 
directors can be expected to have much greater knowledge and more time and expertise at 
their disposal to evaluate the best interests of the corporation than judges.' 
Thus, there are formidable obstacles in the way of shareholders who 
want to challenge the validity of actions taken by directors under powers 
conferred upon them by the articles. Firstly, the Courts will consider the 
provisions in the articles as the dominant -document for determining who 
would have the power to fulfil a particular internal function under the 
principle of the supremacy of the articles of association. Secondly, if the 
powers were prima facie exercised within the limits of the powers 
conferred upon the organs and bona fide and honestly, the courts will 
not, and in fact cannot, second-guess the wisdom of decisions relating to 
these powers. 
The discussion so far naturally leads to the question whether 
shareholders, not satisfied with the way in which directors exercised 
their powers under provisions in the articles, would have any remedies 
available to them. It is submitted that such remedies are indeed 
available. 31 In this article the focus is primarily on the remedy of 
challenging the validity of directors' actions because they have misused 
their powers, but the possibility of challenging directors' actions based on 
non-compliance with statutory provisions or with the provisions of the 
articles of association is briefly mentioned in the next part. 32 
5 Remedies for Shareholders 
5.1 Non-compliance with Statutory Provisions or the Provisions of 
the Articles of Association 
Under circumstances where there was non-compliance with statutory 
provisions or non-compliance with provisions of the articles, any member 
can enforce compliance and restrain the irregular exercise of such 
powers. 33 It should be remembered that the principle that courts cannot 
interfere with duly exercised internal discretions does not mean that they 
will not intervene if the procedures laid down in the articles are not 
followed strictly. It is indeed a general principle of company law that the 
courts will insist on strict adherence to the requirements laid down in the 
31 A detailed analysis of all shareholder remedies falls outside the scope of this article, but see 
See CG Kilian & JJ du Plessis 'Possible Remedies for Shareholders When a Company Refuses to 
Declare Dividends or Declares Inadequate Dividends' 2005 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
(forthcoming) for some of the other remedies available to shareholders. 
32 Another important remedy will be the statutory remedy of oppressive or unfairly prejudicial 
conduct under s 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The oppressive nature of directors' 
decisions have specifically been raised when the directors used their powers for an improper 
purpose: see in particular Wayde v NSW Rugby League supra note 28 at; and Thomas v HW 
Thomas Ltd [1984] 2 ACLC 610. See generally Nicolette Rogers 'When Can Target Directors 
LeWtimately Frustrate a Takeover Bid?' (1994) 12 Company & Securities LJ 207 at 214-5. 
Hoole v Great Western Railroad supra note 28 at 268-9. 
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articles for the exercise of a particular power. 34 This principle will apply 
to all internal matters such as provisions in the articles dealing with the 
removal of directors; issuing of shares; and declaring dividends, that are 
considered to be more than mere procedural issues that could easily be 
rectified by convening subsequent meetings. 35 
The principles involved here could be illustrated by a simple example. 
Suppose a company's articles contain provisions regarding dividends 
similar to arts 84-87 of Table A. Under these articles, the board has the 
power to recommend the amount of dividends (arts 84 and 86 read 
together). The board also has the exclusive power to set aside, out of 
profits, such sums as it thinks fit before making the recommendation 
regarding the amount that will be paid as dividends to the shareholders 
(art 87). Furthermore, the board has wide powers under art 85 to 'pay' 
interim dividends. It is, however, the exclusive power of the general 
meeting under art 84 to declare the dividends, but apparently not interim 
dividends. 
Because of the principles explained above, it is safe to conclude that 
under normal circumstances the general meeting will have no power to 
interfere with the board's discretion to set aside certain sums for a reserve 
or reserves; to recommend or not to recommend an amount to be paid as 
dividends to the shareholders; or to pay interim dividends. On the other 
hand, the directors will not be able to force the general meeting to declare 
the dividends they have recommended as this is an exclusive power of the 
general meeting. 
Conversely, the exercise of these powers would be open for challenge if 
dividends were, for instance, declared without a recommendation by the 
directors; if the amount payable as dividends declared by the general 
meeting exceeds the recommendation by the directors; or if dividends 
were not paid out of divisible profits. Furthermore, if the articles are clear 
that the right to dividends will accrue merely upon the establishment of 
the fact that there are divisible profits, courts will enforce such a right 
against the company irrespective of the fact that dividends were not 
declared by the general meeting. 36 And, if the articles provide that a 
dividend must be paid if there is a divisible profit, courts will insist on 
such payment if there is a divisible profit. 37 Both the last two examples 
clearly illustrate the principle of the supremacy of the articles of 
association. 
34 See Jean J duPlessis 'Some Peculiarities Regarding the Removal of Company Directors' 
(1999) 27 Australian Business LR 6 at 12-3. 
35 Regarding the rule of non-interference by the courts on easily ratifiab1e procedural or 
technical matters, see MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 ChD 13 (CA) at 24 and 25; and Blackman 
op cit note 2 in par 38 at 63-4. See, however, HAJ Ford, RP Austin & IM Ramsay Ford's 
Principles of Corporations Law 11 ed (2003) ('Ford') in par 11.235 at 575 for several exceptions to 
this ru1e. 
36 Henochsberg op cit note 5 at 1054. 
37 Idem at 1056. 
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5.2 Failure to Exercise Power for Their Proper Purpose 
5.2.1 The bona fide and Proper Purpose Doctrines Differentiated 
As mentioned above, courts will not second-guess the decisions taken 
by directors as part of powers conferred upon them by the articles, as 
long as the powers have prima facie been exercised within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon the organs, and have been exercised bona fide as 
well as honestly. When one looks at this statement, it seems as if the only 
way in which shareholders can challenge the decisions of directors taken 
under powers conferred upon them by the articles is on the basis that the 
power was exercised outside the limits of the power conferred upon them, 
mala fide or dishonestly. 38 However, it is submitted that there is in fact 
just one consideration, namely whether the power was exercised for a 
proper or permissible purpose. Mala fides and dishonesty serve only to 
indicate that the power was not exercised for a proper or permissible 
purpose. Perhaps the clearest expression of this principle occurs in the 
case of The Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Co Ltd v Ure: 
'[A]lthough it is a power [power to issue shares] which necessarily involves some 
discretion, it must be exercised, as all such powers must be, bona fideuthat is, for the 
purpose for which it was conferred, not arbitrarily or at the absolute will of the directors, 
but honestly in the interest of the shareholders as a whole.' 39 
In this sense bona fides is defined in terms of the purpose for which the 
power was conferred, but the term bona fides could of course be defined 
in many other ways. 40 However, none of these closer descriptions brings 
us any nearer to a workable way of determining when the acts of directors 
should be set aside because they have not acted bona fide. Developments 
in this area of company law have led to the recognition that there was a 
shift from a requirement that directors must exercise their powers bona 
38 Naude op cit note 6 at 111, under the main heading that directors must exercise their powers 
bona fide, observes as follows on the concept of 'honesty': 'Sy vertrouensposisie bring mee dat 
elke direkteur eerlik moet wees in sy optrede as direkteur. Dit is 'n subjektiewe verpligting wat in 
'n dikwels ingewikkelde praktiese regsverkeer nagekom moet word. Hoewel die basiese vraag is of 
die direkteur inderdaad eerlik was, word eerlikheid gewoonlik aanvaar indien hul optrede die was 
van eerlike sakelui' (emphasis in the original). See generally R C Nolan 'The Proper Purpose 
Doctrine and Company Directors' in: Barry AK Rider (ed) The Realm of Company Law: A 
Collection of Papers in Honour of Professor Leonard Sealy- SJ Berwin Professor of Corporate Law 
at the University of Cambridge (1998) at 8. See also Ross W Parsons 'The Director's Duty of Good 
Faith' (1967) 5 Melbourne University LR 395 at 417; and Sealy op cit note 17 at 269 regarding the 
fact that directors must act 'honestly'. 
39 Supra note 28 at 217 (emphasis in the original). Several of the leading English cases were 
cited as authority for this proposition, including Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 
656 at 671; Automatic Self-cleansing Filter Syndicate Co v Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 at 45; 
British Equitable Co v Baily [1906] AC 35 (ChD) at 42. Cf Rogers op cit note 32 at 210-1; see also 
In rea Company (no 00370 of 1987), Ex parte Glossop [1988] 1 WLR 1068 (Ch) at 1076H-1077A. 
40 See Rogers op cit note 32 at 209 and 210. Rogers is faced with the classic dilemma: just when 
it is thought that the meaning of bona fides is captured (see at 210), its illusory nature becomes 
apparent and then further qualifications become inevitable (see 210 where she must qualify that 
the '[a]cting bona fide also require that .. .'). In actual fact any type of consideration that could 
reflect negatively on directors' intentions, the way in which they have exercised their powers, or 
the result that was achieved by their actions, could possibly indicate that they have not acted bona 
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fide to a requirement that they must exercise their powers for proper or 
permissible purposes. 41 
5.2.2 Types of Action Challenged Based on Improper or 
Impermissible Use of Powers 
The classic cases where the courts were prepared to intervene and set 
aside decisions taken by directors when they exercised a power conferred 
upon them by the articles for an improper or impermissible purpose, deal 
with the power of directors to issue shares. 42 Several other decisions of 
directors were also challenged on this basis. For instance, the decision of 
directors to pay sums of money to the chairman as presents, relying on 
the power conferred upon them to manage the company's business and 
allowing them to borrow money in the name of the company for the 
purpose of its business (the sums were paid to the chairman from money 
borrowed in the name of the company). 43 Also, where the directors used 
company funds to defend their position and to justify why shareholders 
should not vote for a proposed take-over. 44 Other examples include cases 
where directors transferred a major asset of a company just after a take-
over offer was announced, alleging that they did this as an exercise of 
their power to manage the business of the corporation; 45 directors 
incurring substantial debts (purchasing of trading outlets of competing 
companies) and making a huge rights issue to fund the purchase shortly 
after a take-over offer of the company was announced, alleging that it 
was a commercial transaction and a natural expansion of the business of 
the company; 46 and directors refusing to register a person as a 
fide; it is impossible and undesirable to make lists of such considerations and also undesirable to 
try and define bona fides too closely. 
41 See Ford op cit note 35 at 336nl, but note the incorrect reference to Sealy's article (the 
reference should have been to Mon ULR, not to MULR). Cf Sealy op cit note 17 at 267-8. For 
earlier views on this issue, see JR Birds 'Proper Purposes as a Head of Directors' Duties' (1974) 37 
Modern LR 580 at 583; at 580-1 Birds provides an excellent summary of the different doctines at 
pl~ in this area. 
Cilliers & Benade op cit note 3 in par 10.27 at 146. See also Hahlo op cit note 4 at 292; 
Blackman op cit note 19 at 8; R Baxt, K Fletcher & S Fridman Corporations and Associations: 
Cases and Materials 9 ed (2003) at 365; Birds op cit note 41 at 581. 
43 In re George Newman & Co [1895] I Ch 674 at 685. See also Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd 
[1982] 3 AllER 1016 (ChD) at 1044h-j where the Court considered part of the remuneration paid 
to the non-executive director not as 'genuine' remuneration, but a 'disguised gift out of capital'. 
The Court did respect the internal powers conferred upon organs and confirmed that a court will 
not readily interfere with such powers (see at 1023e-1024a; 1038c-d; 1039b-h;l040a-b; 104lc-d; 
and 1043a-b), but 'the real test must be whether the transaction in question (in this case 
remunerating the directors) was a genuine exercise of the power' (at 1039f-g). 
44 Advanced Bank Australia Ltd v FAI Insurance Ltd (1987) NSWLR 464 (CA) at 482-3. The 
Court concluded that in this case the directors' primary purpose was not to act in the best interest 
of the company and to inform the shareholders, but to secure the re-election of the chairman and 
the other retiring directors (see at 482-3, 487 and 496). The reference (at 482) to Peel v London & 
North Western Railway Co [1907] I Ch 5 is interesting. In Peel's case the directors were successful 
in defending their decision to use company funds to solicit proxies in support of their view on 
what was in the best interest of the company regarding a management decision. 
45 Darvall v North Sydney Brick supra note 15 at 659. See also Lee Panavision Ltd v Lee 
Li~hting Ltd [1992] BCLC 22 (CA) at 30g-h. 
6 Pine Vale Investments Ltd v McDonnell & East Ltd (1983) I ACLC 1294. See further Tony 
Steel 'Devensive Tactics in Corporate Takeovers' (1986) 4 Company & Securities LJ 30 at 43-4. 
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shareholder, relying on a provision in the articles that they had the power 
to refuse such registration without giving any reasons for their decision. 47 
In the last three cases, the parties alleging misuse of powers were 
unsuccessful as the courts were not prepared to set aside decisions taken 
by directors without clear substantiation that the directors exercised their 
powers for an improper or impermissible purpose. 
5.2.3 When Will a Court be Prepared to Intervene Based on a Power 
Exercised for an Improper or Impermissible Purpose? 
It will be clear from the discussion above that there is scope for 
shareholders to challenge the validity of a decision taken by the board 
under a power conferred upon them by the articles on the basis that the 
power was exercised for an improper or impermissible purpose. The 
burden of showing that a power has not been properly exercised, is on the 
party complaining. 48 The reason why courts are prepared to set aside 
decisions taken by directors if they exercised their powers for an improper 
or impermissible purpose, is that powers conferred upon directors in the 
articles of association is considered to be fiduciary powers and if they are 
exercised for an improper or impermissible purpose, it will constitute a 
breach of the directors' fiduciary duties. 49 However, it is important to 
consider how the courts have approached this issue and how they have 
reconciled the principle of non-interference with internal matters with the 
principle that they will set aside certain acts of directors if they acted for 
improper or impermissible purposes. Another interesting question is to 
what extent the general meeting can ratify the breach of directors' 
fiduciary duty where they have misused their powers. 50 This falls outside 
the scope of this article. 
5.2.4 Defences by Directors to Justify their Actions 
In a case where the court must consider whether a particular power has 
been exercised for its proper purpose, the court will not simply hear the 
directors say that in exercising the particular power, they have acted 'in 
47 Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance v Ure supra note 28 at 215- 6 and 220. See generally 
Nolan op cit note 38 at 23fT. 
48 Idem at 219; Ngurli Ltd v McCann supra note 8 at 445. See further cases referred to by 
Blackman op cit note 2 in par 122 at 187; see also Parsons op cit note 38 at 425. 
49 Ngurli Ltd v McCann supra note 8 at 439 and 440; Hogg v Cramphorn supra note 28 at 268C 
and 269A; Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum supra note 14 at 834B-C; Lee Panavision v Lee 
Lighting supra note 45 at 29e; Ex parte Glossop case supra note 39 at 1076H-1077A; Kirwan v 
Cresvale Far East Ltd (In Liq) (2002) 44 ACSR 21 (CA, NSW) in par 127 at 56 (per Giles JA). See 
also Cilliers & Benade op cit note 3 in pars 10.27-10.29 at 146-7; Nolan op cit note 38 at 12-7. 
50 See in this regard Bamford v Bamford [1970] Ch 212 (CA) and Hogg v Cramphorn supra note 
28. These cases are considered by KW Wedderburn 'Going the Whole Hogg v Cramphorn?' (1968) 
31 Modern LR 688 and by RB (1974) 48 Australian LJ 319. See generally Hannes v MJH Pty Ltd 
(1992) 10 ACLC 400 (CA, NSW) at 409-10; see also Michele Kyra Havenga Fiduciary Duties of 
Company Directors with Specific Regard to Corporate Opportunities (LLD thesis, University of 
South Mrica (1995)) at 67-8. 
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the best interest of the company as a whole'. 51 The courts have invariably 
rejected such defences in cases where the self-interest of directors was 
involved. 52 In these types of cases, the fact that directors have acted 'in 
the best interest of the company as a whole' has been held to serve no 
other purpose than restating the general law. 53 Another reason why the 
courts have not simply been prepared to accept directors' defences that 
they have acted 'in the best interest of the company as a whole', was that 
in cases where a misuse of powers is alleged, the crucial issue is often not 
'the interest of the company', but the interest of shareholders and what is 
fair between different classes of shareholders. 54 For all these reasons it 
has been argued with some force that directors' duty 'to act bona fide and 
in the interest of the company' should be treated as conceptually 
independent of the duty 'to act for proper purposes'. 55 This distinction is 
now also clearly recognised in s 181(1) of the Australian Corporations 
Act, 2001 requiring that '[a] director or other officer of a corporation 
must exercise their powers and discharge their duties: (a) in good faith in 
the best interest of the corporation; and (b) for a proper purpose.' 
5.2.5 Tests Developed by the Courts Where Powers Were Misused 
or Abused 
It is often the case that directors exercise their powers partly for a 
proper purpose and partly for an improper purpose. Thus, it has been 
51 As to the meaning of the phrase 'best interest of the company as a whole', see Hahlo op cit 
note 4 at 293. But as Parsons op cit note 38 at 396 points out, 'the concept remains miserably 
indeterminate'. It is submitted that it is still the case: see Kirwan v Cresvale Far East supra note 48 
in par 127 at 56 (per Giles JA). I would respectfully agree with Young CJ's observation in Kirwan 
v Cresvale Far East (in par 292 at 90) that '[i]t is of no real use to regurgitate the numerous 
utterances of past courts on this topic'. See also Ex parte Glossop supra note 39 at 1076G; Sealy op 
cit note 17 at 269-71. 
52 Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum supra note 14 at 834G; Hogg v Cramphorn supra note 28 
at 267A ff; Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel supra note 16 at 718; Southern Resources Ltd v Residues 
Treatment & Training C Ltd (1990) 8 ACLC 1151 ((SC (SA)) at 1164; Lee Panavision v Lee 
Lighting supra note 45 at 29d-30h. See also Henochsberg op cit note 5 at 467-8; Steel op cit note 46 
at 31. It is submitted that Blackman op cit note 19 at 7 states the principle too wide when he 
argues that directors will 'still be guilty of acting for an improper purpose' (emphasis added). At 
least a 'self-interest' is required and where there is no such self-interest, the improper or 
im~ermissible purpose must be primary or substantial: see the discussion below. 
3 Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum supra note 14 at 835D. In Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd 
supra note 432 at 1039f (read with 1038b-c), Oliver J observed that under certain circumstance 'a 
test of benefit to the company' (also understood as 'the benefit of the shareholders as a whole') 
'would be largely meaningless'. 
54 Mills v Mills supra note 10 at 164 as quoted with approval in Howard Smith v Ampol 
Petroleum supra note 14 at 835F; and McGuire v Ralph McKay Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 891 at 894. See 
also Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel supra note 16 at 718. See generally Henochsberg op cit note 5 at 
466: 'Where directors act in breach of [the duty to act only under available powers] it is irrelevant 
whether they believe they do so in the interest of the company'. The 'bona fide for the benefit of 
the company as a whole' test was also pertinently rejected in Gambotto v WCP Ltd (1995) 13 
ACLC 342 (HC of A) at 348 as inappropriate '[i]n the context of a special resolution altering the 
articles and giving rise to a conflict of interests and advantages, whether or not it involves an 
ex~ropriation of shares'. 
5 Sarah Worthington 'Directors' Duties, Creditors's Rights and Shareholder Interventions' 
(1991) 18 Melbourne University LR 121 at 122-3 and 123-4; Nolan op cit note 38 at 3 and 7-13; see 
also JH Farrar 'Abuse of Power by Directors' (1974) 32 Cambridge LJ 221 at 221 and 224; 
Havenga op cit note 50 at 65; Ranero op cit note 17 at 425 and 427. 
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necessary for courts to develop rules to enable them to determine, 
especially in cases where there were permissible and impermissible 
purposes, 56 whether the actions of the directors should or should not 
be set aside. It is submitted that the approach of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council, on appeal from the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd is a realistic one that 
should be followed by South African courts. Not only is the case based 
on sound principle, but it relies on several old English and Australian 
cases that are consistent with the South African common law in this area. 
The relevance of the Australian authorities becomes particularly 
apparent if one looks at the numerous references to Australian cases in 
this area in some South African texts. 57 
In Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd it was pointed out that 
when the exercise of a power by the directors is challenged on the basis 
that the power was exercised for an improper or impermissible purpose, 
the first step is to determine what the purpose was for which the 
particular power had been conferred upon the directors. 58 This should be 
determined objectively and by taking into consideration modern 
conditions regarding the purpose of the particular power. 59 The Court 
was, however, realistic to appreciate that there may be more than one 
purpose for which a particular power was conferred upon directors. For 
instance, the main purpose for a power to issue shares is to raise share 
capital, but there may also be other purposes. 60 Several other issues could 
also be taken into consideration in analysing the purpose of a particular 
power cm1ferred upon the directors, including its functions for the 
particular company; the size and nature of the company; and its 
constitution (memorandum and articles) as a whole. 61 
Once the purpose of the power has been determined, the second step 
will be to determine whether, in the light of the particular facts of the 
case, the directors misused that power. In this regards the courts have 
employed the so-called 'substantial or primary purpose' test. The first 
traces of this test in Australia is to be found in the 1923 decision in 
Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance v Ure where the Court looked at 
'the impelling motive' or 'moving cause' when the conduct of directors 
was challenged based on the fact that they had not acted bona fide. 62 A 
56 See McGuire v Ralph McKay supra note 54 at 894. 
57 See in particular Blackman (in LAWSA) op cit note 2 in pars 121-2, 124 and 125. 
58 See generally Ford op cit note 35 at 336 para 8.200. 
59 Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum supra note 14 at 835G. See also Blackman op cit note 19 
at 7. 
60 Howard Smith v Ampo/ Petroleum supra note 14 at 835C and 836Aff. See also Punt v Symons 
& Co Ltd [1903) 2 Ch 506 at 515, referred to in Hogg v Cramphorn supra note 28 at 2670-E; 
Kirwan v Cresvale Far East supra note 48 in pars 123-6 at 51-6 (per Giles JA). See further Ford op 
cit note 35 in par 8.210 at 337; Steel op cit note 46 at 32; Birds op cit note 41 at 583-4; and Sealy op 
cit note 17 at 275-6. 
61 See Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance v Ure supra note 28 at 217. See also Ford op cit 
note 35 in par 8.210 at 336-7; Worthington op cit note 54 at 124-5. 
62 Supra note 28 at 216-7 and 218-9. 
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few years later, in 1938, the test was refined further in the leading case of 
Mills v Mills: 
'The application of the general equitable principle to the acts of directors managing the 
affairs of a company cannot be as nice as it is in the case of trustees exercising a special 
power of appointment. It must, as it seems to me, take the substantial object the 
accomplishment of which formed the real ground of the board's action. If this is within 
the scope of the power, then the power has been validly exercised. But if, except for some 
ulterior and illegitimate object, the power would not have been exercised, that which has 
been attempted as an ostensible exercise of the power will be void, notwithstanding that 
the directors may incidentally bring about a result which is within the purpose of the 
power and which they consider desirable.' 63 
In Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd, after explaining the fact 
that a court cannot interfere on the merits of a management decision or 
act as a kind of supervisory board to judge managerial decisions, Lord 
Wilberforce explained the test as follows: 
'But accepting all this, when a dispute arise whether directors of a company made a 
particular decision for one purpose or for another, or whether, there being more than one 
purpose, one or another purpose was the substantial or primary purpose, the court, in 
their Lordships' opinion, is entitled to look at the situation objectively in order to 
estimate how critical or pressing, or substantial or, per contra, insubstantial an alleged 
requirement may have been.' 64 
What this test amounts to is that if the decision was primarily or 
substantially taken within the purpose for which the power was conferred 
upon the directors (as determined as part of the first step mentioned 
above), the court will not set such a decision aside irrespective of the fact 
that partially or incidentally 65 the power might have been exercised for 
an improper or impermissible purpose. 66 Conversely, if the decision was 
primarily or substantially taken for an improper or impermissible 
purpose, the court will set such a decision aside irrespective of the fact 
that partially or incidentally the power might have been exercised for a 
proper purpose. Once the court has determined that primarily or 
substantially the power was misused, it will not help the directors to 
allege that they had not gained personally or that they had acted 
honestly: the conduct of the directors under attack will then be set aside 
because of the breach of their strict fiduciary duty to exercise their powers 
for the purpose for which the power was conferred upon them. In this 
regard there is no difference between cases where directors made a profit 
by reason and in virtue of their fiduciary office as directors, and the 
misuse of powers. 67 
63 Supra note 10 at 185-6. 
64 Supra note 14 at 832F-G. 
65 In McGuire v Ralph McKay supra note 54 at 895, the Court referred to things incidentally 
following on the decision of the directors under attack (the issuing of shares) as 'a by-product of 
the issue [of shares]'. 
66 See also McGuire v Ralph McKay supra note 54 at 893-6 for a comprehensive discussion of 
the various tests applied by the Australian and English courts in this regard, and M canie 
(London) Ltd v Cook & Watts Ltd (1967) CL Y 481, as referred to in Havenga op cit note 50 at 
67n89. 
67 See Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 AllER 378 (HL) at 391G-H. 
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5.2.6 Later Developments 
The primary or substantial purpose test has been subjected to some 
further scrutiny in Australia. The question was whether the improper or 
impermissible purpose should not only be primary or substantial, but 
whether it should also be the dominant purpose. In Whitehouse v Carlton 
Hotel, the High Court of Australia explained (obiter) as follows: 
'In this court, the predominant view has tended to be that the allotment will be 
invalidated only if the impermissible purpose or combination of impermissible purposes 
can be seen to have been dominant- "substantial" ... ; "the moving cause" .... The cases 
in which that view has been indicated have not, however, required determination of the 
question whether the impermissible purpose must be the substantial object or moving 
cause or whether it may suffice to invalidate the allotment that it be one of a number of 
such objects or causes. As a matter of logic and principle, the preferable view would seem 
to be that, regardless of whether the impermissible purpose was the dominant one or but 
one of a number of significantly contributing causes, the allotment will be invalidated if 
the impermissible purpose was causative in the sense that, but for its presence, "the power 
would not have been exercised" ... '. 68 
In Darvall v North Sydney Brick, Kirby P, in a minority judgment, 69 
explained this approach further by mentioning that the primary or 
substantial purpose test is assisted by 'a rule of thumb', namely that 'it is 
necessary for the court to determine whether but for the allegedly 
improper or collateral purpose, the directors would have performed the 
act which is impugned'. 70 
Two important questions arise from this apparent refinement or 
narrowing down 71 of the original primary or substantial purpose test. 
The first is whether the approach adopted in the High Court case of 
Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel is now law in Australia, and, secondly, how 
the 'but for' test will contribute in assisting courts to determine whether 
or not to set the actions of directors aside when there were both 
permissible and impermissible purposes. 
It is submitted that that the primary or substantial purpose test, as 
developed in the two High Court decisions in Australian Metropolitan 
Life Assurance v Ure and Mills v Mills, and then articulated in the 
decision of the Judicial Commission of the Privy Council in Howard 
Smith v Ampol Petroleum, should still be regarded as the current test in 
cases where a court must decide whether the actions of the directors 
should be set aside because they have exercised a particular power for 
competing permissible and impermissible purposes. There are several 
reasons for this view. 
Firstly, the majority in Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel commented on the 
test obiter and pertinently recognised this by stating that the case did 'not 
68 Supra note 16 at 721. 
69 But indeed a significant minority judgment: see Baxt op cit note 28 at 26. 
70 Supra note 15 at 248 (emphasis in the original). 
71 See Hahlo op cit note 4 at 292, but note that the part reading 'will be invalidated if the 
permissible purpose was causative' should read 'will be invalidated if the impermissible purpose 
was causative'. 
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raise any problem of competing permissible and impermissible 
purposes'. 72 It was for that reason that the majority also conceded that 
it was 'unnecessary to express a concluded view on the question of precise 
formulation of the relevant test [in cases] of competing permissible and 
impermissible purposes'. There can hardly be a clearer indication that the 
majority did not consider the suggested test as a concluded view or a 
precise formulation. The case of McGuire v Ralph McKay, where the test 
in Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel was accepted as a correct statement oflaw, 
was not a High Court decision, but one of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria. 73 Furthermore, it was specifically recognized in McGuire v 
Ralph McKay that the statement in Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel was only 
obiter. It is also significant to note that neither Wilson J nor Brennan J 
who delivered the minority judgments in Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel, 
made any reference to the 'but for' test mentioned obiter by the majority 
in that case. 74 
Secondly, what is really the difference between determining 'the 
moving cause' (a test already adopted in 1938 in Mills v Mills and quoted 
by the majority in Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel) and determining 'the 
substantial object or moving cause' (emphasis in original case), the test 
suggested by the majority judgment in Whitehouse v Carlton? It seems as 
if the majority only adopted the 'but for' test when it is required to 
determine whether the impermissible purpose was 'the substantial object 
or moying cause', but it is difficult to see any difference in determining 
'the moving cause' or determining 'the substantial object or moving 
cause', apart from the emphasis on 'the' that the majority added. It is also 
noteworthy that the majority in fact imported the condictio sine qua non 
test ('but for' test) to determine causation into this area of the law. Not 
only is that test renowned for its complexities, but it has been rejected in 
several other areas of the Australian law as all but the ultimate test to 
determine causation. 75 
Finally, not only did Kirby P 76 assign no greater importance to the 
72 Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel supra note 16 at 721. 
73 It seems as if the only other case where the so-called 'but for' test was applied in this area, is 
the the single judgment of Wheeler J in the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Em/en Pty Ltd 
v St Barbara Mines Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 1107 (SC, WA) at 1112, but without any discussion of 
the substantial or primary purpose test adopted in other superior courts. In Southern Resources v 
Residues Treatment supra note 51 at 1165, there was a brief mention of Whitehouse v Carlton 
Hotel, but the Court found that 'it was unnecessary to formulate or apply that test [apparently the 
test in Whitehouse v Carlton HoteW. 
74 It is no wonder that Sealy op cit note 17 at 276 refers to 'the High Court's somewhat 
surprising obiter dictum in Whitehouse v Carlton that a "single causative" test should replace a 
"substantial purpose test" ... '. 
75 Cf March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 (HC of A); R v Smith [1959] 2 
QB 36 (CA); and Royall v R (1991) 172 CLR 378 (HC of A). See generally Danuta Mendelson 
'Australian Tort Law Reform: Statutory Causation and the Common Law' (2004) 11 J of Law & 
Medicine 492fT. 
76 Kirby P delivered the minority judgment in the case, but as he reached the same conclusion 
as the majority on this point, namely that the directors did not act for improper purposes, it was 
thought better not to use the fact that it was a minority judgment as another reason why his 
comments on the 'but for' test should not be given too much weight. 
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approach in Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel than calling it a 'rule of 
thumb', 77 but his reliance on the High Court Decision of Ngurli Ltd v 
McCann for this statement provides no authority for the introduction of 
the 'but for' test in this area of law. In Ngurli Ltd v Mccann, at the 
relevant page referred to by Kirby P, there is simply a reference to Mills v 
Mills and the statement in the latter decision that '[t]he substantial object 
the accomplishment of which formed the real ground of the board's ... 
action'. 78 
For all these reasons it would be safe to conclude that the introduction 
of the 'but for' test in this area of law was no more than putting 'an 
unnecessary gloss' 79 on the primary or substantial purpose test developed 
over many years. 
5.2.7 Fundamentally a Value Judgment over an Internal Matter is 
Required by the Court 
In order to make a determination of the proper or improper exercise of 
powers by directors, the court will necessarily have to investigate 'the 
state of mind of those who acted and the motive on which they acted'. 80 
This could be a daunting task as it 'involves an inquiry into motivations 
of an almost infinite range of variety'. 81 This is not surprising. 
Firstly, it can be immensely difficult to determine the collective purpose 
of a group such as the directors, especially if individual directors were 
motivated by diverging considerations in reaching a particular decision. 82 
Secondly, how would one expect directors to respond to the fundamental 
question the court must decide in cases where actions they have already 
taken, are challenged on the basis that they have used their powers for an 
improper or impermissible purpose and that they are therefore in breach 
of their fiduciary duties towards the company? One can hardly expect of 
them to say, 'Yes, of course, we are in breach of our fiduciary duties 
because we have used a particular fiduciary power for an improper or 
impermissible purpose and for that reason the court should set aside the 
action(s) we have taken under these powers'. 
It is to be expected that directors will do what they did in all the 
decided cases where their actions have thus far been challenged. They will 
argue that the court should not interfere with internal management 
decisions and they will then explain why they thought that the actions 
they had taken, should not be set aside. In this regard they will use the 
77 Darvall v North Sydney Brick supra note 15 at 248. 
78 Ngurli Ltd v McCann supra note 8 at 445. 
79 The phrase is derived from the article by LS Sealy 'Directors' Duties -An Unnecessary 
Gloss' (1988) 46 Cambridge LJ 175, commenting on a different area of the law. 
80 Hindle v John Cotton Ltd (1919) 56 ScLR 626 at 630-1, as quoted with approval in Australian 
Metropolitan Life Assurance v Ure supra note 28 at 220; and Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum 
suira note 14 at 835A-B. 
1 Pine Vale Investments v McDonnell & East supra note 45 at 1303. 
82 Ford op cit note 35 in par 8.230 at 341. See also the decision by the Full Industrial Relations 
Court of Australia in Re Mcintyre (1995) 131 ALR 689 at 696-7. 
324 (2004) 16 SA Mere LJ 
smorgasbord of defences used on so many occasions over many years: 
'the power was conferred upon us by the articles of association and the 
court should respect the supremacy of the articles of association'; 'the 
power was an exclusive power of the board'; 'a court should not interfere 
with the internal matters of a company'; 'a court should not second-guess 
the decisions of the directors'; 'the directors are in a better position than 
judges to evaluate the best interests of the corporation'; 'there is no 
appeal on merits from management decisions to courts of law'; 'a court of 
law should not assume to act as a kind of supervisory board over 
decisions within the powers of management'; 'the powers were exercised 
bona fide in the interest of the company as a whole'; 'the directors acted 
honestly and had no self-interest in the actions they have taken'; 'there 
were more than one purpose why the power was conferred upon the 
directors and the directors' actions could be justified under any one of 
these purposes'; 'the substantial or primary purpose of the actions of the 
directors have been proper and within the purpose for which the power 
was conferred upon the directors'; or 'a court can only invalidate actions 
of directors if the impermissible purpose was causative in the sense that, 
but for its presence, the power would not have been exercised'. 
The only cases where courts are able to make decisions reasonably 
easily are where directors' self-interests are blatant or where they 
blatantly acted dishonesty. In all the other instances, directors will 
exhaust their available defences one by one, probably starting with the 
straightforward ones at the beginning of the list (in the previous 
paragraph), and moving down that list to the more ingenious ones 
articulated over many years. When the more involved defences are raised, 
courts are indeed faced with complicated legal principles, obscured by 
several cases, and not always easy to reconcile with each other. 83 
But, in essence, courts are expected to make a value judgment or 
second-guess 'the state of mind of those who acted, and the motive on 
which they acted', as was already discovered more than 80 years ago in 
Hindle v John Cotton. 84 It is exactly the difficulties involved in making 
such value judgments or second-guessing the decisions of directors that 
have made courts cautious to enter the arena of internal processes by 
directors in the first place. There is probably no better illustration of this 
hesitation than the case of Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver 85 where Lord 
Wright explained as follows: 
83 Saul Fridman 'An Analysis of the Proper Purpose Rule' (1998) 10 Bond LR 164 at 165-6 and 
179. 
84 Supra note 78 at 630-631. See generally Sealy op cit note 17 at 276. Sealy (at 278) explains 
the consequence of this approach succinctly: 'It may still be true, in principle, that "business 
decisions are for business men", and not a matter for review by the courts, but for judges of 
sufficiently robust disposition that principle is not the deterrent that it may once have been.' See 
also Fridman op cit note 84 at 166. 
85 Supra note 67. It was not a case dealing with the proper or improper exercise of a power, but 
probably the most quoted case dealing with directors' breaches of their fiduciary duty to prevent a 
conflict of interest and duty: see generally Parsons op cit note 38 at 397fT. 
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'[T]he court will not inquire whether the other person is damnified or has lost a profit 
which otherwise he would have got. The fact is in itself a fundamental breach of the 
fiduciary relationship. Nor can the court adequately investigate the matter in most cases. 
The facts are generally difficult to ascertain or are solely in the knowledge of the person 
who is charged. They are matters of surmise ; they are hypothetical because the inquiry is 
as to what would have been the position if that party had not acted as he did, or what he 
might have done if there had not been the temptation to seek his own advantage, if, in 
short, interest had not conflicted with duty.' 86 
The complex nature of such value judgments is the reason why courts 
have been unsuccessful in developing exact guidelines or tests to solve 
these matters. That is also the reason why they will probably continue 
grappling to find appropriate measures to form their value judgments. 87 
One thing is sure: there is no simple way in which courts will ever be able 
to decide whether or not directors used their powers for a proper or 
improper purpose if both permissible and impermissible purposes are 
present. 88 As Ford puts it, 
'[t]here seems to be no escape for the tribunal of fact from the difficult task of deciding 
whether one of a number of puwoses can be taken to have been more important than 
others in the mind of directors.' 
6 Conclusion 
There is a very unique interaction among internal company law 
principles such as the supremacy of the articles of association; non-
interference by other organs with powers conferred exclusively on a 
particular organ; non-interference by the courts with internal company 
decisions; directors' duty to act bona fide and in the best interest of the 
company as a whole; directors' duty to use powers for their proper or 
permissible purpose; and the remedies available if directors did not 
perform their powers for a proper or permissible purpose. They are all 
recognised in company law, but the friction created by them is not always 
properly explained or appreciated. 
One of the aims of this article was to establish when and why courts 
will be prepared to set aside decisions by directors if they were taken for 
an improper or impermissible purpose. It was discovered that the courts 
will be prepared to set the decisions of directors aside when they have 
used a particular power substantially or primarily for an improper or 
86 Supra note 67 at 392H. 
87 The substantial or primary purpose test is a more exact measure than the best interest of the 
company test. Thus, it is submitted that it is a slight overstatement to argue that 'the requirement 
that directors act for a proper purpose adds little to the more general rule that directors must act 
in the best interest of the company': see Fridman op cit note 84 at 182. 
88 In Pine Vale Investments v McDonnell & East supra note 46, the focus was whether the 
directors' actions were 'commercially justifiable'. This could be interpreted as another test to 
determine whether directors acted for a proper or improper purpose. See also Steel op cit note 46 
at 36-8; and Ford op cit note 35 in par 8.210 at 339 with reference to the Canadian case of Teck 
Corp Limited v Millar (1973) 33 DLR (3d) 288 (SC, BC). In the latter case, at 309-17, the existence 
of directors' duty to exercise their powers for a 'proper purpose' was apparently denied: see 
Blackman op cit note 19 at 7n38. 
89 Ford op cit note 35 in par 8.240 at 344. See also Sealy op cit note 17 at 276. 
326 (2004) 16 SA Mere LJ 
impermissible purpose. When the exercise of directors' powers is 
challenged under circumstances where there were both permissible and 
impermissible purposes for exercising a particular power, there is no 
escape for the court but to inquire into the complex area of the state of 
mind of those who acted and the motive on which they acted. This is in 
actual fact second-guessing the decisions of directors. 
